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The Issue 
Global warming or, more accurately, climate change remains a hotly debated issue in 
scientific, government and public circles. While the extent of the human contribution to 
climate change through greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions remains highly controversial, 
the scientific evidence of significant changes in climate per se appears to be mounting 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2001). Since changes in climate typically 
will include greater variability in temperatures, more extreme weather events and changes 
in precipitation patterns as well as a general warming trend, there are significant risks for 
agriculture.
2 If human activity does turn out to have a significant causal effect on climate 
change, the Kyoto Protocol and other related multilateral environmental agreements 
appear to have the potential to reduce these risks. The Kyoto Protocol, however, leaves 
possible channels for increases in emissions or so-called carbon leakage. 
Implications and Conclusions 
This article examines the possibility of global carbon leakage and finds that the Kyoto 
agreement might be counterproductive in the sense that compliance by signatory 
countries could lead to an increase in global GHG emissions. The article reports on a 
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larger project (Pancoast, 2003) and extends the analysis to deal explicitly with 
agricultural issues. The method follows Copeland and Taylor (1994, 1995, 2005), 
Antweiler et al. (2001) and others in applying general equilibrium modeling to explore 
both environmental and international trade linkages between countries. The article 
demonstrates three important results. First, declining agricultural productivity resulting 
from climate change may lead to increases rather than decreases in global emissions and, 
thus, accelerate rather than decelerate the pace of climate change. Second, the exemption 
of developing countries from emission caps under the Kyoto agreement will not only tend 
to generate carbon leakage at the national level as these countries emit more, but will also 
tend to generate carbon leakage at the global level because the increases in emissions by 
the unconstrained developing countries will tend to exceed the reductions by the 
developed countries. Third, the clean development mechanism in the Kyoto agreement, 
which allows firms in developing countries to reduce emissions and sell corresponding 
credits to firms in developed countries, may cause further global carbon leakage. To 
provide a foundation for these results, we construct a simple two-country, two-good, 
general-equilibrium trade model. 
Overview of the Model 
North is a developed country while South is a developing country. Each country has a 
two-sector economy that is diversified in the sense that it produces both a manufactured 
good and an agricultural good. Manufacturing is modeled as a dirty sector where 
emissions occur, while agriculture is assumed to be a clean sector for simplicity. Labour 
is the only conventional input and it is perfectly mobile between sectors within countries, 
but internationally immobile.
3 For convenience, the level of emissions in manufacturing 
is treated as an additional input, which is specific to manufacturing (see Copeland and 
Taylor, 2005). Both sectors are assumed to be competitive. Further, we take a long-run 
perspective where maximum profits are equal to zero. In each sector, the equilibrium 
price is equal to the firms’ minimum long-run average cost. The agricultural good is 
chosen as the numeraire (i.e., its price is always set equal to one) and we focus on the 
price of the manufactured good measured relative to the agricultural good. 
Manufacturing output depends on the level of emissions as well as the labour input. 
The minimum average cost, thus, depends on the price charged per unit of emissions as 
well as the wage paid per unit of labour. In figure 1, the break-even curves for 
manufacturing in North and South, BEMN and BEMS respectively, depict the zero-profit 
equilibrium conditions for the sector where the price is equal to the minimum average 
cost. The negative slopes of these curves arise because an increase in the price of 
emissions would necessitate a reduction in the wage if the zero-profit equilibrium were to 
be maintained. For simplicity, we will assume that the technology is such that the 
minimum efficient scale of output that results in minimum average cost is invariant to 
changes in the ratio of emissions to labour and, thus, to changes in the wage and price of Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  R. Pancoast and J. Gaisford 
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emissions. Further, we assume that technological differences between North and South 
are such that emissions per unit of output are greater in South than North in the initial 
equilibrium. 
The flow of emissions from the manufacturing sector affects the world economy via 
several channels. To begin with, emissions cause local air pollution, which acts as a 
negative national externality that adversely affects national welfare in the polluting 
country.
4 Due to its higher per capita income, it is assumed that North initially has a 
binding cap on aggregate emissions whereas South does not have a binding emissions 
cap.
5 The flow of emissions from manufacturing also increases the stock of GHGs in the 
atmosphere, which contributes to global climate change. Climate change has a negative 
external effect that directly reduces welfare in both countries. As we will see, climate 
change also has adverse indirect effects on national welfare in both countries through 
diminished productivity in agriculture. 
By contrast with manufacturing, agriculture is modeled as a clean sector that does not 
cause emissions. While this may be an overstatement given the sector’s reliance on fuel 
and other emitting inputs, in reality agriculture also plays an important role in combating 
climate change. Agriculture has the ability to sequester carbon dioxide and by so doing it 
removes a key GHG from the atmosphere and deposits it for storage in soils.
6 For 
simplicity, we assume the sector does not have any net emissions. Regardless, the key 
results of the model carry over to the case where there are emissions from agriculture but 
manufacturing is more emissions intensive than agriculture. Climate change is assumed 
to have a negative external effect on labour productivity in agriculture in both North and 
South. The break-even curves for agriculture in North and South, BEAN and BEAS 
Figure 1  Zero-profit equilibrium prices Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  R. Pancoast and J. Gaisford 
 
      98 
 
respectively in figure 1, show the zero-profit equilibrium for the sector conditional on the 
prevailing climate conditions. These curves are independent of the price of emissions 
because agriculture has been assumed to be a non-emitting sector. 
When both countries are diversified in the sense that each produces some of both 
goods, there is a simple recursive or sequential method of determining equilibrium in the 
model. Since the agricultural good is the numeraire, the positions of the break-even 
curves for agriculture in both North and South, BEAN and BEAS in figure 1, are 
determined by labour productivity alone. Because these curves are independent of 
emissions prices, the wages in North and South, WN0 and WS0  respectively, are 
determined at once. Given that North’s labour productivity in agriculture exceeds that of 
South, North’s wage must exceed that of South. In South, where there is no cap or tax on 
emissions, the price of emissions is equal to zero in equilibrium. There is a unique price 
of the manufactured good measured relative to the agricultural good, say PM0, where 
South’s break-even curve for the manufacturing sector, BEMS:PM0, passes through the 
point where the emissions price is VS0 = 0 and the wage is WS0. This allows 
manufacturing as well as agriculture to attain a zero-profit long-run equilibrium.
7 
Meanwhile, in North, the positions of the break-even curves for both agriculture and 
manufacturing are established by the prevailing product prices, PA = 1 and PM0. 
Accordingly, the Northern wage is WN0 and the Northern emissions price is VN0. 
Consequently, emission permits trade at the price of VN0 given the aggregate emissions 
cap initially in place in North. 
The goods markets subsequently determine the quantities produced and consumed in 
each country since the product prices consistent with diversified production in both 
countries have already been determined. If the goods market in the manufacturing sector 
is in equilibrium, a foundational tenet of general equilibrium analysis known as Walras’ 
Law implies that the agricultural sector is in equilibrium as well (Gravelle and Rees, 
2004, ch. 12). Consequently, in what follows we can focus on the international 
equilibrium in the manufacturing sector. Figure 2 shows that North’s supply curve for the 
manufactured good, SN, is positively sloped. Due to the emissions cap, the manufacturing 
sector in North faces increasing costs. In the course of increasing its manufacturing 
output, the North’s price of emissions is bid up and the long-run minimum average cost 
increases. This requires a higher price for the manufactured good if the North’s 
manufacturing firms are to earn zero profit at the higher output. By contrast, South is able 
to supply the manufactured good perfectly elastically at a price of PM0, because it is not 
constrained by an emissions cap. As entry leads to additional manufacturing output in 
South, its emissions simply rise in proportion to output. If we say that xsº represents the 
underlying profit-maximizing emissions level per Southern firm where the value of the 
marginal product of emissions is equal to zero, then each new entrant increases South’s 
emissions by exactly xsº. Given that D is the world demand curve for the manufactured 
good in figure 2, the equilibrium output of the manufactured good in North is MN0 and Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  R. Pancoast and J. Gaisford 
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world consumption is MD0. Southern manufacturing output makes up the difference, 
MS0 = MD0 – MN0, at the price of PM0. This, of course, assumes that it is feasible for 
South to produce MS0 given its labour endowment. 
Climate Change and Agriculture 
The buildup of emissions over time is assumed to cause changes in climate leading to 
reduced agricultural productivity. As a benchmark, we consider the case where 
agricultural output per worker falls by the same proportion in both countries, say by 
10 percent. In response to the decline in agricultural productivity, the break-even curves 
for agriculture in North and South, BEAN and BEAS in figure 1, shift downward by 
10 percent since the agricultural sector is no longer able to afford the initial wages, WN0 
and WS0. Indeed, wages must fall by 10 percent in each country for agriculture to break 
even. The immediate effect of declining agricultural output is a situation of excess 
demand for the agricultural good and excess supply of the manufactured good. In 
response, the price of the manufactured good measured relative to the agricultural good 
must decline by exactly 10 percent if South is to remain diversified. If the price of the 
manufactured good falls by less (more) than 10 percent, South will specialize completely 
in manufacturing (agriculture). A 10 percent decrease in the price of the manufactured 
good shifts the break-even curves for the manufacturing sector in each country inward 
toward the origin by 10 percent because the sector must pay 10 percent less for its inputs 
if it is to break even. The wage in South and the wage and the emission price in North, 
Quantity,
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thus, fall by 10 percent relative to the agricultural good but remain unchanged in terms of 
the manufactured good. The manufacturing price line and the Northern supply curve 
shown in figure 2 shift downward by 10 percent, leaving manufacturing output in North 
unchanged. Supposing for a moment that the demand for the manufactured good were 
independent of income, consumption of the manufactured good would increase 
unambiguously and new output and additional emissions would be forthcoming from 
South. In the case where the demand for the manufactured good is independent of 
income, therefore, the general equilibrium effects of declining agricultural productivity 
unambiguously lead to accelerated climate change.
8 
Fortunately, income effects in demand are likely to mitigate and could conceivably 
reverse the trend toward accelerated climate change. The income elasticity of demand for 
the manufactured good is likely to exceed that for the agricultural good. Consequently, 
the decline in real income associated with reduced agricultural productivity will shift the 
demand curve for the manufactured good inward in figure 2 and at least partially offset 
the increase in consumption associated with the lower price. The general equilibrium 
effects of reduced agricultural productivity will only result in deceleration, rather than 
acceleration, in the accumulation of GHGs and the pace of climate change if the income 
effect is sufficiently strong that consumption of the manufactured good actually declines. 
While the possibility of accelerated climate change through the adverse effect of 
emissions on agricultural productivity arises in the context of a simple model, this 
analysis should prompt further general-equilibrium research. Such research is particularly 
important since the degree of decrease in agricultural productivity is likely to be highly 
asymmetric across regions, with some regions actually gaining. 
Northern Emission Reductions under the Kyoto Agreement 
A key feature of the Kyoto Protocol is that the Annex I countries, consisting of developed 
countries and transition economies, commit to reductions in GHG emissions. While 
developing countries may face future limits to emissions, they remain unconstrained 
under the first round of commitments specified by the Kyoto Protocol. To aid in 
understanding the Kyoto Protocol, therefore, we explore the impact of tightening North’s 
emissions cap in the context of our model. 
The reduction in North’s aggregate emissions cannot affect wages in either country, 
the price of emissions in North or the world price of the manufactured good, because the 
break-even curves in figure 1 all remain unchanged due to the sequential structure of the 
equilibrium, which was discussed previously. In figure 2, North’s manufacturing supply 
curve, SN, shifts to the left due to the tighter emissions constraint. North’s aggregate 
output declines as Northern firms are driven to exit from the manufacturing sector. Since 
South’s supply of the manufactured product is perfectly elastic at the price of PM0, there 
is, however, an exactly offsetting increase in the aggregate output of South as new 
manufacturing firms enter the sector. As a result, global emissions unambiguously Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  R. Pancoast and J. Gaisford 
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increase as relatively clean Northern manufacturing firms are displaced by relatively dirty 
Southern ones. The exemption of South from emissions constraints thus leads definitively 
to global carbon leakage in our simple general equilibrium model.  
Here it is interesting to observe that the refusal of the United States to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol may actually reduce the extent of this global carbon leakage. If the 
United States does not unilaterally tighten its emission constraint, the magnitude of the 
leftward shift in the Northern supply curve in figure 2 will be reduced. Consequently, the 
degree of displacement of manufacturing production from the relatively clean North to 
the relatively dirty South will be reduced and global emissions will increase to a lesser 
extent. These strong unambiguous results do depend on the fact that there are two goods, 
but only one conventional factor, namely labour, in addition to emissions. If the number 
of inputs excluding emissions were greater than or equal to the number of goods, 
however, South’s supply curve would not be perfectly elastic; South’s manufacturing 
output would rise by a lesser magnitude than the North’s decline and thereby at least 
open the possibility of a decline in global emissions. 
Emission Credits under the Kyoto Agreement 
Another important feature of the Kyoto Protocol, the clean development mechanism 
(CDM), allows Northern firms to buy emission credits from Southern firms when the 
latter commit to adopting cleaner production techniques. Essentially, a Northern firm 
pays a Southern firm to reduce emissions and the credit allows it to increase emissions by 
the same magnitude. As a starting point, assume that North has already tightened its 
emissions cap, leading to increased manufacturing output in South and increased global 
emissions as discussed in the previous section. Prior to the opening of trade in credits, 
therefore, the price of emissions is positive in North but equal to zero in South. An 
unrestricted credit system would equalize emissions prices in North and South, resulting 
in a fully integrated world emissions market. Alternatively, restricted credit systems are 
also possible. For example, the European Union and many environmentalists favoured 
so-called supplementarity restrictions, which would have limited the use of credits in 
achieving national emission targets (Pancoast, 2003). Such a restricted credit system 
would prevent full integration of the world emissions market and retain a distortion. 
Much of our focus now turns to the number of manufacturing firms, especially those 
in South. Recall that xsº denotes the emissions level of each Southern firm before trade in 
emissions credits begins. The effect of credits on global emissions depends critically on 
whether there is entry or exit from Southern manufacturing. This is because each 
additional Southern firm adds xsº emissions to the world total, either directly by way of 
its own emissions or indirectly by selling credits that allow Northern firms to emit more.
9 
The entry of additional Northern firms does not have a similar effect because entrants, 
like incumbents, fall under North’s aggregate cap. The only way that the Northern Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  R. Pancoast and J. Gaisford 
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manufacturing sector can increase emissions above this cap is by purchasing credits from 
Southern firms. 
Implementation of either an unrestricted or restricted credit system affects world 
goods markets by enhancing the efficiency of the manufacturing sector. As the 
underlying markets for emissions become more integrated with manufacturing firms in 
North compensating those in South for their reductions in emissions, the opportunity cost 
and long-run equilibrium price of the manufactured good decline. The lower price of the 
manufactured good, in turn, increases consumption and necessitates entry into the 
manufacturing sector in at least one country. If the ratio of manufacturing firms in South 
relative to North remains constant, there will be entry into manufacturing in both North 
and South, with the latter causing increased world emissions. 
The ratio of the number of manufacturing firms in South relative to North, however, 
may change in either direction due to the integration of world emissions markets. 
Implementing a credit system causes the emissions prices in North and South to equalize 
or at least converge. As the emissions price in North declines, the demand for credits per 
Northern firm rises, and as the emissions price increases in South, the supply of credits 
per Southern firm rises. If the magnitude of the former effect aggregated over the initial 
number of firms in North is greater (smaller) than the latter effect aggregated over the 
firms in South, there will be excess demand for (supply of) credits and the equilibration 
of the emissions market will require an increase (decrease) in the number of 
manufacturing firms in South relative to that in North.  
To equilibrate both the world emissions market and the world goods market when the 
credit system is introduced, entry into manufacturing must occur in at least one country 
and may well occur in both countries. With overall world manufacturing output 
increasing, a decrease in the ratio of manufacturing firms in South relative to North is a 
necessary but by no means sufficient condition for a reduction in the number of Southern 
manufacturing firms and a corresponding reduction in global emissions. Consequently, 
there is a strong possibility that the credit system will lead to entry into Southern 
manufacturing and a concomitant increase in world emissions. Since the increase in 
global emissions arising from the new more stringent Northern emissions cap preceded 
this analysis, it follows that the credit system in the Kyoto agreement may further worsen 
global carbon leakage.  
Policy Synopsis 
While the Kyoto agreement has frequently been criticized on economic efficiency 
grounds, the importance of the climate change issue has convinced many observers that it 
is time to move forward for environmental reasons notwithstanding any economic 
shortcomings. The current article questions the view that the Kyoto agreement is 
sufficiently good for the environment that it should be implemented with haste. Ironically 
the Kyoto agreement may actually exacerbate the environmental problem it is intended to Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  R. Pancoast and J. Gaisford 
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mitigate. By design, the model used in this article provides a simple general equilibrium 
framework. Undoubtedly, adding policy details and modeling complications may qualify 
the strong results concerning global carbon leakage. Even so, the analysis should sound 
an important note of caution concerning the potential effects of the Kyoto Protocol on 
climate change. 
                                                             
Endnotes 
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the Institute for Advanced Policy 
Research (IAPR) at the University of Calgary. The analysis and views expressed in this 
paper, however, do not necessarily reflect those of the IAPR or the University of Calgary. 
2 Of course, the impact on agriculture will not be uniformly negative; certain regions or 
subregions stand to gain. While there have been mixed results reported for Canadian 
regions and Canada as a whole, a recent study by Weber and Hauer (2003) predicts 
positive effects. 
3 Many of the results in international economics depend on the number of tradables, 
usually goods, versus non-tradables, usually factors (Dixit and Norman, 1980). 
Consequently, adding additional inputs such as land without adding additional goods 
weakens some of the results of the model as discussed below. Capital could be added 
without substantive changes, however, if it were assumed to be fully mobile between 
countries. 
4 It would be straightforward to allow international pollution spillovers such as acid rain. 
5 This implies that, prior to Kyoto, there were indirect controls on GHG emissions in 
place in North, but not South, through abatement measures on other air pollutants. 
6 Carbon sequestration in soils is enhanced with the introduction of minimum tillage 
techniques, long-term planting activities, etc. It should be recognized that sequestration is 
not guaranteed to provide a permanent reduction of GHGs. The sequestered carbon 
dioxide can be re-released to the atmosphere with the re-introduction of intensive tillage 
techniques, for instance. 
7 Since South has a one-factor (Ricardian) technology with a linear production possibility 
frontier, PM0 is the unique price at which South can be diversified or produce both goods. 
It is noteworthy that South’s break-even curve for the manufacturing sector, BEMS:PM0, 
remains negatively sloped. Suppose that South introduced a Pigouvian tax policy such 
that its emissions price VS rose above zero. With the price of the manufacture constant at 
PM0, South’s wage would have to fall if its manufacturing sector were to continue to 
break even. 
8 This is before consideration of any lost or reversed sequestration effects arising from 
declining agricultural activity, which would further contribute to accelerated climate 
change. 
9 The CDM rules require additional emission reductions compared to the business-as-
usual baseline at the project level. There are also measures to control for leakage or 
displacement of emissions within the defined boundaries of the specified project. 
Importantly, however, CDM does not have sufficient measures in place to constrain 
emissions at the economy-wide level; thus, the entry of new (polluting) firms opens the 
possibility of an overall increase in South emissions. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  R. Pancoast and J. Gaisford 
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